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test the feasibility of the brigade being deployed within 96 hours. If the Army cannot deploy the brigade in 96 hours, the service needs to determine ways to enhance the IBCT's deployability. Furthermore, the author determined it necessary to examine sealift as a viable alternative to transporting the IBCT. Because of the brigade's logistical austereness, sealift of additional stocks with the brigade's organic equipment would enhance the unit's survivability and combat effectiveness. Furthermore, in the Army's design of this force, the author could not find any evidence that sealift had been tested as a viable alternative to airlift when deploying the IBCT.
The author gathered empirical evidence of the deployment of the IBCT using the Joint Flow Analysis System (JFAST) simulation. A JFAST simulated deployment was conducted to the country of Rwanda using both sealift and airlift from a CONUS-based location. A time phased force deployment data list was created using the JFAST database that was comparable to the current IBCT in weight, size, and number of personnel. The results of the simulation showed that it was impossible for the brigade to deploy within 96 hours, and that the brigade could deploy more rapidly by sea than by air. The simulation showed that airlift deployment time would be in weeks, not hours. This was due to limited throughput capability at third world country airfields as being the major constraining factor preventing a 96 hour deployment by air. This is particularly relevant because third world countries are sites of the most likely contingency operations that will require the deployment of an IBCT.
Based on the simulation results, the author recommends that the Army should rely on a combination of sealift and airlift in deploying the IBCT. The IBCT is too austere logistically, not to deploy additional stocks with organic units into a contingency area. These logistics either must be deployed before the IBCT or be integrated in the flow of IBCT personnel and equipment. A combination of sealift and airlift would deploy the IBCT into a contingency area more rapidly, more effectively use limited airlift assets, and ensure more survivability and combat effectiveness of the brigade. The Army should also explore the possibility of prepositioning an IBCT set of equipment afloat, since this would reduce sealift times from CONUS. Furthermore, the Army should stop advertising the 96-hour deployment goal, and instead focus on the fundamentals of modern deployment using both airlift and sealift.
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INTRODUCTION
General Eric Shinseki emphasized in his vision statement upon assuming his responsibilities as Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), the need for the service to be more strategically deployable into any spectrum of operation.
We will provide the nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. The Army's deployment is the surest sign of America's commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on land. 1 To accomplish this objective the CSA has directed the force to be more responsive and deployable. He spoke of responsiveness in terms of time, distance, and sustained momentum.
We will provide strategic responsiveness through forward-deployed forces, forward positioned capabilities, engagement, and when called, through force projection from the Continental United States or any other where needed capabilities arise. 2 With emphasis on deployability Shinseki said, We will develop the capability to put combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after lift-off -in brigade combat teams for both stability and support operations and for warfighting. We will build that capability into a momentum that generates a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. 3 The genesis of the CSA's vision statement was the perception of slow deployment of Army forces on Operation Desert Shield (Saudi Arabia -1990) and Operation Allied Force (Albania-1999 Macgregor. His proposed force consists of a reconnaissance squadron, three combined arms battalions, an indirect fire battalion, a C4I battalion, and a group support battalion. Overall, Macgregor's proposed force consisted of 4,600 personnel. 9 The current IBCT consists of a reconnaissance and target acquisition battalion, three infantry battalions, a field artillery battalion, and 24 th ID (Mechanized) completed its deployment into theater with the 197 th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning Georgia closing on 24 Sep. 5 Ibid., 245. 6 Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 31 January 2000, 42-43 . This unit included a corps aviation brigade headquarters, a corps artillery brigade headquarters with a Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion, an attack helicopter regiment (Apache), a ground maneuver brigade combat team, a corps support group, a signal battalion, a headquarters troop battalion, a military police detachment, a psychological operations detachment, and a special operations command and control element. an anti-tank company, a signal company, and an engineer company, and totals 3,494 personnel.
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As one can see, the IBCT is similar to the heavy combat group proposed by Macgregor.
Experts outside the Army supported Macgregor's challenge. In 1999, shortly after Task Force Hawk, Jeffrey Record, a former professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote that the Army should stop making marginal changes to its heavy forces and fundamentally reorganize into more strategically mobile combat groups.
The issue is not whether the United States needs an army in the post-Cold war world: it does. Or whether it needs heavy forces; it does. Rather, the issue is whether the United States needs an army both lighter and more specialized for small-scale contingencies than it now has. I believe it does.
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One can conclude that Colonel Macgregor's Breaking the Phalanx was a challenge to the Army's senior leadership to reorganize the force into a lighter, more strategically responsive force. The CSA's 1999 Vision statement directed the Army to meet that challenge.
The IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept explains the purpose of the IBCT. Army options available to warfighting CINCs for joint contingency response are too limited. Army light forces can deploy quite rapidly -within a matter of days -but they lack the lethality, mobility, and staying power necessary to assure decision. On the other hand, Army mechanized forces possess substantial lethality and staying power, but they require too much time to deploy, given current joint capabilities for strategic lift, affording the adversary too much time to prepare for the arrival of US forces.
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The IBCT is designed as a full-spectrum, early-entry combat force, intended to deploy within 96 hours of first aircraft wheels up. 13 The brigade will be self-sustaining for up to 72 hours once in the area of operations. 14 To enhance strategic responsiveness, the IBCT is designed to be fully C- An answer on if the IBCT is deployable within 96 hours can be approached by conducting a transportation feasibility analysis of the IBCT using a simulation to determine feasible deployment timelines. The simulation identifies factors that the Army can use to enhance the deployability of the IBCT. The recommended enhancements should meet the following criteria.
First, recommendations will be based on empirical results, through either simulation or quantifiable evidence; and second, recommendations will be limited to the use of existing Department of Defense resources. It is beyond the scope of this monograph to discuss the need for more transportation assets. Instead, the author will focus on efficient use of existing assets to enhance strategic deployability. Chapter 4 will address other important considerations beyond the simulation and which are currently assumed in the IBCT design. These considerations are 
IBCT LOGISTICS
Before any discussion on the deployment of the IBCT, the reader needs to understand the true austereness of the IBCT's logistical structure. The IBCT Organizational and Operational
Concept states:
The CSS structure of the IBCT is purposefully austere to enhance deployability and force mobility. Initial sustainment will rely on a combination of unit basic loads and strategic configured sets pre-positioned to arrive in theater early. Selfsustained operations for 72 hours of combat is the threshold capability. Sustainment stocks must be integrated into the deployment flow to sustain early arriving elements beyond the initial 72 hours.
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These 72 hours include fuel, ammunition, and water. The IBCT Organizational and Operational
Concept assumes that theater resupply systems for fuel, ammunition, and water must exist before the IBCT can be deployed. If these resupply systems do not exist before the brigade's deployment, then the IBCT risks its survivability and ability to accomplish any mission. The assets and personnel to establish and operate these resupply systems will compete with the organic units of the IBCT for initial airlift.
Fuel is the most critical shortfall in the logistics capability of the IBCT. The brigade is totally dependent upon an established fuel system in theater. The IBCT only deploys with packaged petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and the fuel which exists in the fuel tanks of its vehicles.
According to the IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept fuel distribution will be accomplished within the contingency area with 14-2,500 gallon fuel trucks with 14 trailers holding two 500 gallons drums. However, none of these assets carry fuel when in-flight. 18 The theater is to provide these fuel stocks. Furthermore, a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), similar to that which the IBCT will possess, has a fuel capacity of 53 gallons with a range of 312 miles in non-combat conditions. 19 In combat conditions a LAV will need to be refueled between six to eight hours of sustained combat. 20 However, the Air Force will not transport vehicles with fullfuel tanks. The Air Force may require vehicles to have less than a quarter tank of fuel before airlift. 21 Therefore, in order to have any combat effectiveness, a LAV will have to be refueled during the Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration phase of the deployment. By these estimations, it is doubtful that the IBCT could sustain without additional fuel within the first 24 hours after arrival in theater. It is imperative that an established fuel distribution system is inplace before the arrival of an IBCT. The delivery of fuel in theater will compete with IBCT organic units for airlift.
As with fuel, the brigade relies on an established theater ammunition resupply system.
The IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept only addresses the capabilities of the brigade ammunition section to receive and issue ammunition. 22 The IBCT will only deploy with its basic load of ammunition. If an ammunition resupply system is not in-place, and the brigade participates in high intensity combat soon after arriving at the APOD, then the unit will risk expending all ammunition within three days. For example, the basic load for each 155mm
Howitzer is 135 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) rounds. If the brigade conducts an attack, in high intensity conflict conditions, the required supply rate for each of the 18 howitzers in an IBCT is 50 DPICM rounds per day. Therefore, if a resupply system is not inplace, the howitzers will expend all DPICM rounds within three days after the attack is launched.
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For water supply, the IBCT also relies on a bulk distribution system of water in theater. The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported CINC's concept of operations and phase those forces into the theater. Force planning consists of determination of force requirements, development of force list to meet those requirements, and force shortfall identification and resolution. Even though the CINC is responsible for force planning, the service components do most of the work. This is also divided into time between transportation nodes. In addition, JFAST provides the number and type of transportation assets used, cargo and personnel delivery dates, and the shortfall of cargo and personnel that could not be delivered due to lack of transportation assets.
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JFAST also accounts for port throughput. Throughput is the quantity of cargo and personnel that can pass through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a 33 Ibid., G-48. 34 Ibid., G-60. 35 Ibid., G-78. 36 The author determined these limitations by conducting numerous simulations using JFAST version 6.1. transportation asset, or from unloading a transportation asset and clearing a port. 37 Throughput is driven by the quality and quantity of infrastructure at a port. For example, runway length and ramp space determine the maximum number of airplanes that can be on the ground (MOG). An airfield's MOG directly effects the airfields throughput -the smaller the MOG, the smaller the throughput. Every major port throughput data in the world is accounted for in JFAST and can be adjusted as circumstances change.
However, the information provided by JFAST has its limits, particularly in the older version of 6.1 used for this research. if they are included in a TPFDD. However, the system does not require that these critical units be used.
39
Even with these constraints, a planner can manipulate much of the data in JFAST to assess certain deployment factors. A planner can adjust ship positions, routes, available transportation assets, and port throughput. A planner can adjust the positions of ships (prior to Cday) in relation to the SPOE to measure differences in transportation time. Planners can change the numbers and types of transportation assets and change port throughput capabilities to measure differences in delivery times.
The author developed several TPFDDs and tested their transportation feasibility using aircraft has a range of 6,320 miles and a maximum cargo capacity of 135 short tons. The C-17 has in-flight refueling capability and has a maximum cargo capacity of approximately 85 short tons. 41 The main advantage of the C-17 is the elimination of the requirement for transshipment airfields and the ability of direct delivery of cargo to the APOD.
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If the Air Force flew strategic airlift to a transshipment airfield, this would require the transfer cargo to C-130 aircraft to fly to the APOD in the contingency area. Based on this evidence, the Army should be more concerned with maximizing the airlift potential of the C-17, rather than the C-130.
The sealift assets used in the JFAST were fast sealift ships with a speed of 27 knots per hour; roll-on/roll-off ships with a speed of 21 knots per hour; and breakbulk ships with a speed of 18 knots per hour. 44 The author used only U.S. ships because of historical unwillingness and diplomatic sensitivity of other countries to support all U.S. military action. In Operation Desert
Shield, some foreign crews hesitated to complete voyages to the Persian Gulf demonstrating their lack of dependability in future conflicts.
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The author chose a Rwandan scenario to test the deployability of an IBCT based upon A single, reinforced brigade would have sufficed, given that the territory, population, specific tasks, and potential adversaries would not have been as great as those envisioned in the maximum intervention. Ideally, the ready brigade of the 101 st Air Assault Division would have been designated, supplemented by two additional light infantry battalions, support units for peace operations, and additional helicopters and motorized vehicles -for a force of 6,000 personnel, weighing about 10,000 tons.
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The moderate intervention force proposed by Kuperman is similar in size, weight, and capabilities (less helicopters) to an IBCT employed separate from a division.
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The deployment challenge presented to a planner is another reason for choosing Rwanda as a deployment scenario for the IBCT. The nearest seaport to Rwanda is in Mombassa Kenya.
Kuperman wrote, "Transporting a force of appropriate size 10,000 miles to a landlocked country with limited airfield capability is not a trivial exercise, and would have taken considerably longer than some retrospective appraisals have suggested."
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Since an unclassified TPFDD does not exist within JFAST for the current IBCT, the author had to configure a force that resembled the IBCT in number of personnel and weight of equipment. The JFAST 6.1 TPFDD developed weighed 9,233 short tons comparable to the IBCT's 10,503 short tons; had 4,010 personnel comparable to the IBCT's 3, 494 personnel; and possessed 190, 220 We have asked scientists to develop materials for a vehicle that is lethal and survivable, but lighter and deployable, the kind of vehicle we will need for the transformed Army. Such a vehicle should weigh 20 to 25 tons and fit into C-130 aircraft so it can get anywhere.
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Aircraft typically "cube-out" due to space restrictions, before they "gross-out" due to weight restrictions. For the simulated deployment of the IBCT, the author used home-station locations to replicate the existing IBCT as closely as possible. Even though the IBCT is designed to be only airlifted, it is important to test the transportability of the IBCT via sealift. The author wanted to examine all transportation assets available, and not assume that sealift was always slower than (Newport News VA: MTMC, 1994), A-9. This is the figure quoted for At Kigali airport, the maximum one-day throughput was 526 tons. In addition, during a particularly busy four-day stretch, the airport handled thirty-three strategic and twenty-six tactical U.S. sorties, possibly in addition to a few NGO flights, a daily average of at least eight strategic and six tactical sorties. Assuming a realistic capacity of five C-141, three C-5, and six C-130 aircraft per day, the airport would have a maximum sustainable cargo throughput of approximately 400 tons daily. countries. The IBCT will most likely deploy to these type of countries.
As previously discussed, the author also examined moving the IBCT using sealift. Even though the IBCT has been designed to deploy only by airlift, it is important to test the viability of sealift. Sealift is one of the three major components of the strategic mobility triad that must be empirically explored before concluding only to use one mode of transportation. Furthermore, with sealift the IBCT could deploy with additional logistic stocks to enhance its survivability and The sealift scenarios were run using different types of ships and different ship positions before C-day. Using two fast sealift ships positioned on the U.S. West Coast before C-day, the IBCT was able to close into Mombassa in 21 days. With the two fast sealift ships positioned in the Gulf of Mexico before C-day, the IBCT took 28 days to close into Mombassa. Therefore, this simulation run concludes that a ship's positioning, before C-day, effects total deployment time. In this case, deployment time was effected by seven days.
Additionally the types of ships used effect deployment time. In this course of action, a one-day difference resulted in using the old breakbulk ships and the lash ship, versus the two fast sealift ships. 61 With two breakbulk ships and one lash ship positioned in the Atlantic Gulf before C-day, the IBCT took 29 days to close into Mombassa. Allowing for rest stops, security, detours, etc., one has to allow at least three days to make this journey. Therefore, after Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration in Mombassa Kenya on C+21, the IBCT would not arrive into Kigali Rwanda until C+24, at the earliest. Figure 1 shows the results of the simulated JFAST deployment of the IBCT into Rwanda. The two most important results from the simulation are that the Air Force cannot airlift the IBCT in four days, and it is faster to deploy the IBCT's equipment by sea than by airlift. Several sensitivity analyses were conducted on the factors of throughput, types and numbers of transportation assets, and positioning of ships before C-day. By using airlift only, the IBCT did not close into Rwanda until C+29; 25 days later than the CSA's goal. Kuperman proposes an air assault brigade consisting of 2,500 troops and 4,500 short tons. One third of the IBCT would be 1,500 troops and 3,300 short tons. 64 In JFAST it took 29 days to airlift the entire IBCT into Kigali. Therefore, the author estimates it would and capabilities of the IBCT. The methodology that Kuperman used to calculate his deployment timelines is very close to the JFAST 6.1 algorithms. 65 Kuperman used two APODs in determining his deployment timeline, whereas only one APOD was used in the JFAST simulation in chapter two.
IBCT Deployment into Rwanda
Strategic airlift would not have relied on Kigali airport, which was still a battleground in the civil war, but on Bujumbura Burundi, from which cargo could have been transported to western Rwanda by truck, helicopter, or fixed-wing tactical airlift. Entebbe would have been a stage to receive additional strategic airlift sorties and to transload cargo for tactical sorties to Bujumbura or the smaller airfields in the western half of Rwanda and neighboring Zaire. 66 Kuperman calculates it would take 21 days to deploy a reinforced brigade from CONUS to Rwanda using the two airfields (Bujumbura and Entebbe) as APODs.
Airlift probably would have been most constrained by the load out from the United States, because the 101 st Division can generate at most 600 tons of cargo daily. At that rate, seventeen days would have been required for loading out the force. Several additional days must be allotted for the delay between intervention order and the start of load out, the gradual ramp-up of theater airfield capacity, travel time to the theater, and unloading. Accordingly, the force could not have closed in the theater until more than three weeks after the deployment order. take approximately 10 days to deploy one-third of the force. 65 The JFAST 6.1 simulation of the deployment of the IBCT-like force of approximately 4,000 personnel and 10,000 short tons into Kigali IAP took 29 days. Using Kuperman's methodology of simply dividing the greatest daily cargo throughput constraint at any node along the transportation route -400 daily cargo short tons at Kigali IAP, into the total weight of the deployed force -9,233 short tons, one arrives at 23 days for loading out the force and an additional six days for the delay between deployment order and starting airlift, ramp-up capacity of theater airfields, travel to theater, and unloading. 66 Army should commit and prepare for the RSOI and security responsibilities at APODs, and ensure those additional forces are included in the TPFDD flow. 79 The RSOI requirements at each APOD include as a minimum, fuel, water, a movement control team, and a material management team. As discussed in chapter two, fuel and water resupply are necessary upon arrival. A movement control team, with material handling equipment, links up material and equipment, arranges any additional lift that may be necessary, and handles all customs and highway regulation requirements in the contingency area. The material management team accesses the theater supply system and processes requisitions. Depending on the unit basic load, food rations may have to be available as well. If high intensity conflict is expected, additional ammunition will have to be available as well. These personnel, equipment, and logistical stocks must arrive in the contingency area before or during the IBCT deployment.
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The simulation showed that an IBCT closed in theater sooner by sending its equipment by sealift rather than by airlift. Even with the long arduous 600 mile road march from Mombassa to Rwanda, the IBCT's equipment closed into theater five days earlier (C+24) than by airlift alone (C+29). The wheeled vehicles in an IBCT could conduct this road march much easier than the tracked vehicles in legacy armor or mechanized force. The C+24 date is still 20 days after the CSA's visionary goal of a brigade deployment to anywhere in the world within four days.
Third, the positioning of ships before C-day effected the simulated deployment times.
Because the author only used ships from the Military Sealift Command (U.S. flagships) in the deployments, the numbers were limited. The simulation could not draw on Korean ships on the 79 (JP) 4-01.8, IV -9. Force protection functions at each APOD would include providing theater air defense, providing APOD facility defense, providing Military Police support, and providing protection against weapons of mass destruction. According to page IV-9, the Army would provide a cargo transfer company to integrate with each tanker airlift control element at each APOD. All these forces would significantly add forces and equipment to the flow before the IBCT could deploy. 80 LTC(P) Waters. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE IBCT
The JFAST deployment simulation demonstrated that the IBCT could not deploy into Rwanda within 96 hours, the CSA's stated goal in his 1999 vision statement. The simulation showed that it would take 29 days to deploy the IBCT via airlift into the one APOD at Kigali Rwanda; and 24 days to deploy the IBCT via sealift into one SPOD at Mombassa Kenya, and then conducting an overland movement across Kenya, through Tanzania, and into Rwanda. The simulation assumed that there was accurate TPFDD planning and control, adequate airfield and logistics support, air superiority, RSOI, and sufficient security and force protection measures in place at the APODs. Furthermore, the simulation assumed that the IBCT was fully trained in load out procedures to maximize McChord AFB's 2,800 daily throughput capability.
The purpose of this chapter is to recommend enhancements by the Army to increase the deployability of the IBCT based upon results of the JFAST simulation and historical evidence.
The recommendations will follow the format of the strategic mobility triad -airlift, sealift, and prepositioning. 82 Even though the IBCT was designed for airlift, the JFAST simulation results demonstrated the IBCT could deploy faster by sealift. Therefore, it is imperative that options including sealift and prepositioning are included in enhancing the IBCT's deployability.
81 Also the types of ships used in the simulation resulted in different deployment times. Two fast sealift ships deployed cargo one day sooner to Mombassa than two breakbulk ships and one roll-on/roll ship. Fast sealift ships in the simulation accounted for as much as a four day decrease in deployment times over old breakbulk, roll-on/roll-off, and lash ships. Furthermore, JFAST 6.1's database did not contain any large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs), which can haul significantly more cargo than a fast sealift ship and are faster than a breakbulk or lash ship. According to the Military Sealift Command, Fact Sheet a fast sealift ship's maximum speed is 27 knots per hour and an LMSR's speed is 23 knots per hour 82 Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Joint Planning Orientation Course (JPOC), Lesson 10 -Transportation Planning, located at www.ppc.pims.org/projects/jpoc/htmldocs/lesson10.
Airlift recommendations are focused on improving throughput capacity at both the APOE and APOD. The Army can directly affect the throughput capacity at APOEs by emphasizing load out training. Throughput in theater could be improved by the Air Force setting up and operating multiple APODs and by increasing the MOG capability at airfields. The Army can support the addition of multiple APODs in theater by providing additional troops to conduct force protection and security associated with those APODs. The Army can also provide support for RSOI capabilities at the additional APODs. The Air Force has the assigned assets to increase an airfield's MOG capability. However, Army planners need to be aware that any improvements to an APOD's MOG will use most of the initial airlift allocation in an operation. 83 These improvements will also make the IBCT's 96-hour deployment timeline unachievable. To increase an airfield' MOG, additional assets such as forklifts, fuelers, aircraft maintenance equipment, and material handling equipment must be deployed before any IBCT units. If sufficient prior planning has occurred and these assets have been prepositioned near the contingency area, the Air Force plans on three days to transport these assets. However, if an airfield needs additional ramp space, then it may take weeks to make this improvement.
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Since most APOEs in CONUS have a large throughput capacity, the Army should emphasize load out deployment training. Historical evidence from Desert Shield demonstrates that even the elite units tagged for the rapid reaction force were untrained in deployment operations. 85 The first IBCT fielded at Fort Lewis Washington will most likely use McChord AFB as an APOE with a large throughput capacity of 2,800 daily short tons. Therefore, the IBCT needs to ensure that they are trained in load out procedures in order to utilize the full capacity of this airfield. From the analysis of the JFAST results, the daily cargo throughput at the APOD in Kigali Rwanda was the constraining factor in the air deployment of the IBCT. The simulation assumed that the IBCT was fully trained in load out procedures. Kigali IAP only has a daily throughput capacity of 400 short tons as compared to McChord AFB, which has a daily throughput capacity of 2,800 tons. Therefore, a planner should focus on increasing daily cargo throughput in theater.
As previously discussed in chapter three, utilizing additional APODs in theater will increase cargo daily throughput. The second way to increase airfield throughput is by increasing the MOG capability. However, the Army is limited in its ability to directly increase MOG capability at each APOD. That capability rests entirely on Air Force assets. The Air Force, through its Air Mobility Command, uses a tanker airlift control element to add personnel and materials handling equipment to a field to increase the MOG capability.
86 As previously discussed, increasing an airfields MOG can take three days to weeks, depending on the condition of the airfield. Does anyone think our next mission will be in a first-world country? No, we will continue to go places that lack everything from major air and seaports to railways, bridges and road networks.
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It is very unlikely that the IBCT would be deployed to an area with first-rate airfields.
The Air Force would have to dedicate immense resources to add more APODs in theater and/or increase the MOG capability at the airfields. This would mean more Army support to help run and secure the APODs before the IBCT is deployed. Therefore, the Army needs to examine the other parts of the strategic mobility triad in order to enhance the deployment of the IBCT.
The second part of the strategic mobility triad is sealift. The JFAST simulation demonstrated that the IBCT could deploy more rapidly into Rwanda using sealift than airlift. Based on the recent AOASF trip to CENTCOM, there is no emphasis placed on sealift. The reasoning follows the logic that forces are needed too rapidly in theater to wait for sealift. Therefore, there has been limited effort to develop an SPOD in theater. A reason given for no SPOD in theater was that the force protection requirements would be too great. 99 Mehaffey, 9.
training. The IBCT at Fort Lewis could easily conduct sea emergency deployment exercises using the port of Tacoma.
Therefore, based on the simulation, the Army should pursue planning to use fast sealift ships to move the IBCT. The Army should also pursue a commitment from the U.S.
Transportation Command to dedicate fast sealift ships to move the IBCT. Then the IBCT should design a deployment training program, which would focus both on air and ship deployability.
The third part of the strategic mobility triad is prepositioning. Prepositioned equipment sets were not included in the JFAST simulation. However, having afloat sets of IBCT equipment would enhance the deployability of the unit. Since Operation Desert Storm, the Army has made great improvements in its prepositioned sets of heavy brigade equipment. The JFAST results assumed many perfect conditions existed to enable a successful deployment, including RSOI, air superiority, and airfield security. If these conditions do not exist before the deployment of the IBCT, then the entire operation could be in jeopardy. In the deployment of legacy forces, the Army deliberately plans for the successful accomplishment of these conditions. The IBCT Organization and Operational Concept assumes these conditions will exist, or they are inherently capable within the IBCT organization. However, these conditions are so important that a planner must deliberately address them when planning a deployment. The Army cannot afford to assume that the organizational design of the IBCT properly addresses these conditions.
CHAPTER FIVE
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Other major considerations that have not been addressed effect the deployment of any force. These considerations are RSOI, air superiority, and airfield security. The IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept briefly addresses these considerations by explaining them away in the design and the employment of the brigade. The JFAST simulation did not address these considerations. These considerations are so important that they could prevent the successful deployment of any force, regardless of the strategic lift and throughput capabilities.
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to briefly discuss their impact to the total deployment equation. An entire monograph addressed some of these considerations related to the IBCT. The concept relies too much on the internal capabilities of the brigade. The goal of reducing the legacy "tooth to tail" ratio has left the brigade extremely dependent on other organizations for sustainability and survivability. These concerns go beyond deployability, and warrant further examination. However, these considerations need to be calculated into the IBCT's deployment timeline.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the IBCT is to allow the Army to rapidly deploy a lethal and survivable force into contingency areas across the entire spectrum of conflict. With the IBCT, the Army plans to fill the gap between capability and deployability that currently exists between heavy and light forces. Hence, the IBCT was designed to be more lethal, survivable, and effective than a light brigade and more deployable than a heavy brigade. As a deployment yardstick in designing the IBCT, the Army has used 96 hours -the CSA's goal of having a brigade deploy anywhere in the world. To achieve this 96-hour goal the Army has designed the entire IBCT on being deployable by air.
Because of this airlift requirement for the IBCT, the brigade is very austere. When deployed into an operational area, the unit will depend on reach-back systems for much of its logistical support including fuel, ammunition, water, and medical resupply. The brigade will only initially have the fuel in its vehicles' fuel tanks for ground mobility. Unit basic load of ammunition in the brigade will barely sustain three days of high intensity combat. Without a theater water distribution system, the brigade is drastically short of meeting its water requirements. The brigade also only deploys with enough repair parts to last it only 96 hours.
The organic medical capabilities of the brigade are extremely limited as well, making it dependent on additional hospital support in theater.
Even with this austereness in logistics, simulation has proven that the IBCT cannot deploy into a third world environment, the environment for which the brigade was designed, within 96 hours. Indeed the airlift deployment time will be in weeks, not hours, due to limited throughput capability at any likely aerial ports of debarkation. Evidence of limited throughput slowing down deployments in the simulation is supported by real world contingencies including Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and Task Force Hawk in Albania. Only when deploying the brigade to very well established airfields will the IBCT ever be able to deploy within 96 hours.
The probability of ever deploying the brigade to a first-rate region, which possesses first-rate airfields, is highly unlikely and does not equate to full spectrum deployability worldwide.
The IBCT could deploy into multiple airfields and thus take advantage of the unit's distributed operations capability. However, more APODs in theater mean more personnel and equipment to support and secure the APODs. The trade-off in shortening the deployment timeline may not be worth the cost of more resources and increased security or mission risk.
The simulation assumed that the brigade was fully trained in load-out procedures in order to maximize the throughput capability at a large airfield, like McChord AFB in Washington. To decrease deployment timelines, the IBCT must master all the deployment skills. Deployment training should be a major focus of the unit's mission essential task list. This is just as important as tactical training.
Additionally, because of the IBCT's logistical austereness, the airlift needed to establish the logistical infrastructure to support the brigade's deployment will compete with the organic elements of the brigade. Thus, the actual deployment time of the organic units of the brigade will be much longer than simulated. The IBCT will also compete for airlift with the Air Force. Airlift will be needed to move the Air Force tanker airlift control elements to an airfield before the arrival of any IBCT troops, as well as for all air operations.
The design of the IBCT is dependent on other conditions that must be met before its deployment. These conditions include effective Reception Staging and Onward Integration, air superiority, and airfield security. The brigade cannot RSOI itself. Additional forces will have to be on the ground to accomplish this function. Airlift for the personnel and equipment necessary for RSOI may lengthen the deployment of the IBCT. Additionally, the IBCT is designed only to deploy into areas with air superiority. However, if air superiority does not exist in a theater, deployment can be a dangerous slow process and extremely risky. Airfield security is also assumed in the deployment of an IBCT. Small shoulder-fired air defense weapons can threaten airlift. One rocket-propelled grenade could destroy a C-17 aircraft as it is making its final approach into an airfield. If airfields are not properly secured, deployments could be prevented.
The Army needs to stop publicizing its 96-hour goal. It is impossible that the IBCT will ever be able to reach this goal. Instead, the Army should focus on enhancing the deployability of the IBCT. The simulation results demonstrated that the IBCT could deploy faster to Rwanda by sea than by air. The IBCT could deploy more logistics using sealift, and would be much more sustainable and survivable. Therefore, the Army needs to reexamine other parts of the strategic mobility triad in deploying the IBCT. Simulation results demonstrated the capabilities of fast sealift ships over older type ships. As the primary customer, the Army should support significant, critical, and expensive improvements to the Military Sealift Commands fleet. The IBCT should also train on its ability to deploy by sea. Sea Emergency Readiness Exercises can be executed with the IBCT at Fort Lewis Washington, using Tacoma as an SPOE. Furthermore, the Army needs to examine the possibility of prepositioning an IBCT set of equipment afloat, reducing the steaming time of the brigade from CONUS.
This monograph did not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of an IBCT's capability. Only the validity of deploying the unit in 96 hours was examined. The IBCT maybe a necessary force structure change to the Army. However, the Army should not advertise the unit will deploy in 96 hours. Additionally, the Army should not rely solely on airlift for deployment of the force. The service needs to return to the fundamentals of modern deployment when deploying the IBCT, combining sealift with airlift.
